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“A NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM” 
THE LATE-MODERNISM OF AYN RAND 
!
‘It	stood	on	the	edge	of	the	Boston	Post	Road,	two	small	structures	of	glass	and	
concrete	forming	a	semicircle	among	the	trees:	the	cylinder	of	the	of;ice	and	the	
long,	low	oval	of	the	diner,	with	gasoline	pumps	as	the	colonnade	of	a	forecourt	
between	them’. 	The	writer	goes	on	to	describe	this	modernist	petrol	station	in	1
terms	that	recall	the	rapture	of	Marinetti,	recounting	the	car-crash	that	launched	
Futurism;	 or	 of	 Le	 Corbusier,	 encountering	 the	 titanic	 reawakening	 of	 Parisian	
traf;ic	that	led	him	to	develop	his	Voisin	Plan,	a	new	approach	to	urban-planning	
formulated	speci;ically	 in	order	to	facilitate	a	free	movement	of	automobiles.	 ‘It	
looked	like	a	cluster	of	bubbles	hanging	low	over	the	ground,	not	quite	touching	
it,	to	be	swept	aside	in	an	instant	on	a	wind	of	speed;	it	looked	gay,	with	the	hard,	
bracing	gaiety	of	ef;iciency,	like	a	powerful	airplane	engine’.	 		2
	 	 	 	 	But	this	building	is	designed	neither	by	Mies	van	der	Rohe	nor	Arne	Jacobsen	
It	 is	 the	creation	of	Howard	Roark,	hero	of	Ayn	Rand’s	novel	The	Fountainhead	
(1943)	–	and	it	is	worth	underlining	how	strange	this	ought	to	seem.	A	declared	
Romantic	(who	favored	Victor	Hugo	over	the	sort	of	innovators	who	never	used	
capitals,	never	used	commas	and	wrote	poems	that	neither	rhymed	nor	scanned)	
Rand	must	appear	an	unlikely	 champion	of	modernism	 in	architecture.	 Indeed,	
Rand’s	 egoist	 philosophy	 presents	 a	 perfect	 example	 of	 that	mistrust	 of	 grand	
narrative	 now	 recognized	 to	 be	 central	 to	 the	 ‘cultural	 logic	 of	 late-capitalism’,	
post-modernism.	In	place	of	‘all	the	variants	of	modern	collectivism	(communist,	
fascist,	Nazi,	etc.),	which	preserve	the	religious-altruist	ethics	in	full	and	merely	
substitute	 “society”	 for	 God	 as	 the	 bene;iciary	 of	 man’s	 self-immolation’,	 Rand	
proposes	a	new	social	order	geared	to	the	individual:	‘a	free,	productive,	rational	
system	that	 rewards	 the	best	 in	every	man,	and	which	 is,	 [as	Frederic	 Jameson	
rather	feared	it	might	be]	obviously,	laissez-faire	capitalism’. 		3
	 	 	 	 	In	fact,	Rand’s	philosophy	has	had	a	role	equal	or	greater	than	that	of	Milton	
Friedman	or	F.A.	Hayek	in	shaping	a	contemporary	neo-liberal	consensus,	having	
had	an	avowed	impact	upon	theorists	such	as	George	Gilder,	whose	Wealth	and	
Poverty	 (1981)	 has	 been	 called	 the	 “bible”	 of	 the	 Reagan	 administration,	 and	
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Charles	Murray,	who	launched	an	early,	in;luential	attack	on	the	welfare-state	in	
Losing	Ground	(1984).	Rand’s	philosophy	is	regularly	cited	as	an	inspiration	by	a	
new	breed	of	industrialists	based	in	California’s	Silicon	Valley,	where	the	IT	and	
business-models	that	powered	the	neo-liberal	experiment	were	;irst	developed.	
In;luential	public	;igures	on	the	American	right	Rush	Limbaugh,	Rick	Santelli	and	
Paul	Ryan	have	recently	endorsed	Rand’s	work.	And,	as	is	now	well	known,	Alan	
Greenspan,	Chairman	of	 the	U.S.	 Federal	Reserve	between	1987	and	2006,	 and	
perhaps	the	primary	architect	of	our	highly	deregulated	and	globalised	;inancial	
order	is	her	protégé. 	4
	 	 	 	 	And	yet,	there	is	clearly	no	discrepancy	between	Roark’s	modernist	practice	
and	his	“post-modernist”	philosophy.	The	fact	is	that	Rand	presents	readers	with	
a	total	philosophy	for	living	–	in	a	period	supposedly	wary	of	the	great	modernist	
passion	 for	 system	building.	 ‘Weary	 from	Communism,	 fascism,	 and	 two	world	
wars	intellectuals	were	above	all	uninterested	in	ideology,’	writes	Jennifer	Burns	
in	 her	 biography	 The	 Goddess	 of	 the	 Markets	 (2009):	 ‘Rand’s	 Objectivism,	 a	
completely	 integrated	 rational,	 atheistic	 philosophical	 system	 delivered	 via	 a	
thousand-page	 novel,	was	 simply	 not	what	most	 established	 intellectuals	were	
looking	 for	 in	1957.’ 	No	doubt	one	could	argue	Rand	 is	a	 transitional	 ;igure	 in	5
the	great	twentieth-century	paradigm	shift.	Equally	disregarding	the	extravagant	
claims	made	for	her	work	by	her	acolytes	and	the	blanket	dismissal	of	ideological	
opponents,	one	might	conceivably	characterize	Rand	as	a	right-wing	counterpart	
to	Aldous	Huxley:	a	resolutely	middlebrow	writer,	who	chose	to	apply	ideas	and	
techniques	pioneered	by	modernists	without	being	of	that	movement,	and	again	
like	Huxley	(or	Robert	Graves)	eventually	to	enjoy	untimely	success	with	the	rise	
of	a	 later	generation,	 in	 the	sixties.	To	some	extent	 this	 is	clearly	correct.	But,	 I	
suggest,	this	analogy	only	serves	to	underscore	the	inadequacy	of	the	theoretical	
terms	coined	in	that	;irst,	heroic	attempt	to	describe	theories	and	practices	that	
had	 no	 place	 in	what	was	 then	 universally	 agreed	 to	 constitute	 the	modernist	
movement:	 neither	 in	 the	 (radical)	 empiricist	 tradition	 that	 inspired	 Marcel	
Proust’s	 La	 recherche	 du	 temps	 perdu	 and	 Gertrude	 Stein’s	 The	 Making	 of	
Americans,	 nor	 in	 the	 mainstream	 of	 (Hegelian)	 Idealism,	 wherein	 one	 might	
place	the	inter-subjectivity	of	T.S.	Eliot’s	The	Waste	Land,	nor	yet	in	any	tradition	
representing	the	admixture	of	these,	the	cultural	logic	of	late	capitalism	seemed	
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to	 possess	 no	 obvious	 precedent:	 and	 was	 therefore	 declared	 to	 be	 post-
modernist.	I	suggest	this	is	a	mistake.	
					In	this	article	I	propose	to	show	that	Rand’s	Objectivism	must	be	recognized	as	
a	 late	modernism:	–	 an	untimely	 contribution	 to	 a	body	of	discourse	produced	
(for	the	most	part)	immediately	prior	to	WWI	–	which	itself	constituted	a	belated	
response	to	the	insurrectionary	egoist	philosophy	of	the	renegade	Hegelian	Max	
Stirner.	Though	the	impact	of	Stirnerian	Egoism	has	been	examined	in	the	work	
of	individual	writers,	sporadically,	over	the	past	four	decades,	by	critics	Michael	
Levenson,	Bruce	Clarke,	 John	F.	Welsh,	 and	Michel	Rabaté,	 this	 body	of	writing	
has	never	been	considered	together:	and	understood	to	constitute	a	modernism	
possessing	 a	philosophical	 basis	distinct	 from	 that	 of	 the	mainstreams.	 I	 argue	
that,	through	Ayn	Rand	primarily,	the	modernism	of	radical	subjectivity	survived	
well	beyond	the	point	thought	to	mark	its	extinction	post-WWI;	that	the	cultural	
logic	 of	 late	 capitalism	 is	 based,	 to	 a	 signi;icant	 degree,	 upon	 this	 modernist	
interpretation	 of	 Stirnerian	 Egoism.	 The	 political	 urgency	 of	 the	 reappraisal	
undertaken	 in	 this	 essay	need	hardly	be	 spelt	 out.	 Endeavors	 to	 engage	with	 a	
contemporary	hyper-modernist	transformation	of	our	city-spaces,	with	the	slow	
perversion	of	our	social	and	economic	systems,	must	remain	ineffectual	as	long	
as	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 cultural	 logic	 underpinning	 the	 grand	 “neo-liberal”	
insurrection	is	distorted	by	a	terminology	as	yet	inexact.		
!
!
*	 *	 *	
!
Disavow	the	immediate	past.	The	gesture	is	characteristically	modernist	–	and	in	
this	respect	Howard	Roark	is	entirely	typical.	‘I	inherit	nothing’,	he	says.	‘I	stand	
at	the	end	of	no	tradition.	I	may,	perhaps,	stand	at	the	beginning	of	one.’ 	Rand,	6
his	creator,	was	to	make	similar	claims.	‘The	only	philosopher	she	acknowledged	
as	an	in;luence	was	Aristotle’,	writes	her	most	recent	biographer,	Jennifer	Burns.	
‘Beyond	his	works,	Rand	insisted	that	she	was	unaffected	by	external	in;luences	
or	 ideas.’ 	Her	oeuvre	presents	readers	with	what	appears	to	be	a	self-enclosed	7
system	of	 thought;	 if	Rand	 requires	an	authoritative	opinion	 she	will	often	cite	
one	of	her	own	;ictional	characters,	as	though	these	were	real	people.	‘When	I	am	
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questioned	about	myself,’	she	wrote	in	1945,	‘I	am	tempted	to	say,	paraphrasing	
Roark:	“Don’t	ask	me	about	my	family,	my	childhood,	my	friends	or	my	feelings.	
Ask	me	about	the	things	I	think”.’ 	In	the	eyes	of	her	many	fans,	Rand	is	a	sort	of	8
phoenix,	 possessing	 no	 context	 save	 her	 own	 creativity,	 the	 fountainhead	 that	
produced	 the	 universe	 they	 inhabit,	 ex	 nihilio.	 ‘It	 is	 the	 content	 of	 a	 person’s	
brain,	not	the	accidental	details	of	his	life,	that	determines	his	character.	My	own	
character	 is	 in	 the	pages	of	The	Fountainhead.	For	anyone	who	wishes	 to	know	
me,	that	 is	essential.	The	speci;ic	events	of	my	private	life	are	of	no	importance	
whatever.	 I	 have	 never	 had	 any	 private	 life	 in	 the	 usual	 sense	 of	 the	word.	My	
writing	is	my	life.’ 		9
					As	political	scholar	and	libertarian	theorist	Chris	Matthew	Sciabarra	remarks,	
Rand’s	 self-portrait	 ‘verges	 on	 the	 rei;ication	 of	 her	 intellect	 as	 a	 disembodied	
abstraction	…	this	is	strange	as	Rand	herself	often	paid	close	attention	to	context	
in	her	analysis	of	philosophical	and	cultural	 trends’. 	 In	Ayn	Rand:	The	Russian	10
Radical	(1995),	Sciabarra	suggests	that	an	assessment	of	her	philosophy	cannot	
be	complete	without	a	contextual	and	developmental	basis.	‘Rand	was	notorious	
for	maintaining	that	her	intellectual	debt	to	other	thinkers	was	very	limited.	And	
yet	 in	my	own	research,	 I	discovered	similarities	between	Rand’s	approach	and	
the	 dialectical	 approach	 of	 Hegelians	 and	 Marxists.’ 	 While	 noting	 that	 Rand	11
would	have	denied	such	a	link	vehemently,	Sciabarra	believes	that	at	some	point	
in	her	intellectual	development	Rand	had	absorbed,	perhaps	unwittingly,	crucial	
aspects	of	a	speci;ically	dialectical	method	of	analysis:	that	is	to	say,	the	attempt	
to	overcome	formal	dualism	and	monistic	reductionism,	to	uncover	assumptions	
shared	by	apparent	opposites,	to	achieve	a	transcendent	perspective	that	insists	
on	the	integrity	of	the	whole.	‘Rand’s	revolt	against	formal	dualism	is	illustrated	
in	 her	 rejection	 of	 such	 “false	 alternatives”	 as	 materialism	 and	 idealism,	
intrinsicism	 and	 subjectivism,	 rationalism	 and	 empiricism’,	 observes	 Sciabarra.	
‘Moreover,	 Rand	 always	 views	 the	 polarities	 as	 “mutually”	 or	 “reciprocally	
reinforcing,”	“two	sides	of	the	same	coin”.’	According	to	Sciabarra,	this	is	no	mere	
technique.	‘Rand	was	the	;irst	to	admit	that	a	writer’s	style	is	a	product	of	his	or	
her	“psycho-epistemology”	or	method	of	awareness’. 		12
					Sciabarra	traces	Hegelian	elements	in	Ayn	Rand’s	;iction	and	philosophy	back	
to	her	 time	 in	St.	Petersburg.	His	pioneering	book	was	 the	 ;irst	 to	 suggest	 that	
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Rand’s	 studies	 in	 the	years	 immediately	 following	 the	Russian	Revolution	must	
be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 any	 serious	 assessment	 of	 her	 philosophical	 work.	
During	her	time	at	the	Stoiunin	Gymnasium	and	later	in	the	Department	of	Social	
Pedagogy	at	the	University	of	Petrograd,	Rand	would	have	encountered	the	most	
highly-regarded	 Hegelians	 of	 that	 era,	 the	most	 signi;icant	 of	 these	 being	 N.O.	
Lossky,	who	held	a	position	in	pre-WWI	Russian	philosophy	comparable	to	that	
of	 his	 contemporary	 F.H.	 Bradley	 in	 England.	 Creator	 of	 a	 distinctively	Russian	
variety	of	Hegelianism	that	fused	Slavicist	politics	and	mystical	elements	derived	
from	Russian	Orthodox	tradition,	Professor	Lossky	had	 lectured	at	 the	Stoiunin	
Gymnasium	on	Fichte,	Hegel	and	Schelling	in	the	years	that	Rand	was	a	student	
there	and,	 though	the	State	Scienti;ic	Council	had	compelled	him	to	retire	 from	
his	university	post	 in	the	year	Rand	enrolled,	he	might	have	provided	unof;icial	
tuition	to	students	on	the	history	of	ancient	 thought.	 In	conversations	with	her	
;irst	 biographer	 Barbara	 Branden,	 Rand	 described	 Lossky	 as	 a	 ‘distinguished	
international	 authority	 on	 Plato’	 –	 though	 this	 was	 not	 his	 primary	 area	 of	
expertise	 –	 and	 recalled	 with	 pride	 that	 Lossky	 had	 praised	 her	 forthright	
rejection	of	Platonism. 	The	passage	is	suggestive,	Sciabarra	points	out:	the	one	13
teacher	 whose	 approval	 ever	 seems	 to	 have	 counted	 for	 anything	 with	 Rand,	
Lossky	 is	not	recognized	as	a	Hegelian	–	so	might	be	 the	means	whereby	Rand	
acquired	a	dialectical	method	of	analysis	without	being	aware	that	she	was	doing	
so.	Sciabarra’s	theory	has	met	with	mixed	responses.	While	biographer	Jennifer	
Burns	 reserves	 judgment,	 another	 recent	 biographer,	 Anne	 C.	 Heller	 endorses	
Sciabarra,	stating	that	Rand	‘learned	from	Lossky	an	intensely	dialectical	method	
of	thinking	–	“thinking	in	principles”,	she	called	it	–	which	helped	her	to	construct	
a	 worldview	 that	 was	 radically	 individualistic	 and	 seemingly	 Western	 but	 in	
some	ways	Russian	to	the	core.’ 	14
					But	Rand	was	far	from	short	on	teaching	material	that	set	out	the	background	
to	 historical	 materialism	 –	 and	 so	 one	 really	 has	 to	 question	 how	 Rand	 could	
have	failed	to	recognize	critical	procedures	taught	by	Lossky	/	other	Hegelians	at	
the	university	for	what	they	were.	In	semi-autobiographical	novel	We	the	Living	
(1936),	Rand	 lists	 the	 lectures	her	 character	Kira	 is	 forced	 to	 attend,	 satirizing	
the	 proportion	 of	 pro-Bolshevik	 material	 on	 the	 syllabus:	 ‘Proletarian	Women	
and	Illiteracy,’	‘The	Spirit	of	the	Collective’,	‘Proletarian	Electri;ication’,	‘The	Doom	
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of	Capitalism’,	 ‘The	Red	Peasant’,	 ‘The	ABC	of	Communism’,	 ‘Comrade	Lenin	and	
Comrade	 Marx’	 and	 ‘Marx	 and	 Collectivism’. 	 Rand	 later	 complained	 that	 her	15
university	degree	program	 ‘began	with	Plato,	whom	 the	 regime	 claimed	 as	 the	
forerunner	to	historical	materialism,	then	went	to	Hegel,	then	to	Marx.’ 	‘For	the	16
rest	 of	 her	 life,’	 writes	 Barbara	 Branden,	 ‘Alice	 knew	 that	 she	 understood	 the	
theory	of	dialectical	materialism	–	and	had	on	her	body	and	spirit	the	scars	of	its	
practice	 –	 as	 few	 Americans	 would;	 she	 did	 not	 bear	 with	 equanimity	 the	
remarks	 of	 anyone	 who	 ventured	 to	 tell	 her	 “what	 communism	 really	 was	 all	
about”.’ 		17
				But	if	Rand	knew	she	understood	the	theory	of	dialectical	materialism	one	must	
really	struggle	to	explain	the	paradox	that	is	‘For	the	New	Intellectual’	(1960):	an	
essay	 that	performs	 the	very	 ‘triple	somersaults’	Rand	ridicules	 in	 the	moment	
she	 criticizes	 the	 ‘plain	Witch-doctory	of	Hegel’. 	 If	not	 the	 result	of	 ignorance	18
nor	bad	faith,	might	this	apparent	discrepancy	between	the	values	expressed	and	
procedures	 employed	 indicate	 that	 Rand’s	 dialectical	 procedure	 was	 derived	
from	 a	 source	 she	 had	 good	 reason	 to	 regard	 as	 anti-Hegelian?	 The	 historical	
overview	 provided	 in	 ‘For	 the	 New	 Intellectual’	 certainly	 bears	 an	 astonishing	
resemblance	to	that	offered	by	renegade	Hegelian	Max	Stirner	in	the	second	part	
of	Der	Einzige	und	sein	Eigenthum:	that	historical	progression	from	1)	the	initial	
tyranny	 of	 physical	 facts	 –	 through	 2)	 the	 religious	 or	 ideological	 tyranny	 of	
shaman	/	priest	/	humanist	–	which	 ;inally	 culminates	 in	3)	 freedom	 for	 living	
Ego. 		19
	 	 	 	 	The	three	 ‘contestants’	described	in	Rand’s	essay	precisely	correspond	to	a	
speci;ically	Stirnerian	application	of	the	dialectical	method.	First,	there	is	Attila,	
‘the	man	who	rules	by	brute	force,	acts	on	the	range	of	the	moment,	is	concerned	
with	nothing	but	 the	physical	 reality	 immediately	before	him,	 respects	nothing	
but	man’s	muscles,	and	regards	a	;ist,	a	club	or	a	gun	as	the	only	answer	to	any	
problem’. 	Next,	the	Witch	Doctor,	 ‘the	man	who	dreads	physical	reality,	dreads	20
the	 necessity	 of	 practical	 action,	 and	 escapes	 into	 his	 emotions,	 into	 visions	 of	
some	mystic	 realm	where	his	wishes	 enjoy	 a	 supernatural	 power	unlimited	by	
the	absolutes	of	nature.’ 	And	though	these	two	;igures	–	the	man	of	 force	and	21
the	man	of	faith	–	might	appear	to	be	opposites,	they	share	‘a	consciousness	held	
down	 to	 the	 perceptual	 method	 of	 functioning,’	 which	 Rand	 glosses	 as	 an	
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‘awareness	that	does	not	choose	to	extend	beyond	the	automatic,	the	immediate,	
the	given,	 the	 involuntary,	which	means:	an	animal’s	 “epistemology”.’	According	
to	 Rand,	 ‘Man’s	 consciousness	 shares	 with	 animals	 the	 ;irst	 two	 stages	 of	 its	
development:	 sensations	 and	 perceptions;	 but	 it	 is	 the	 third	 state,	 conceptions,	
that	makes	him	man’. 	As	in	the	writings	of	Dora	Marsden	and	Wyndham	Lewis	22
before	her,	Stirner’s	third	stage	in	the	history	of	mankind	is	 identi;ied	with	this	
capacity	for	integrating	perceptions	into	conceptions	by	a	process	of	abstraction;	
that	is	to	say,	reason	or	thought. 	In	Rand’s	philosophy,	only	an	egoist	can	think	23
for	himself	–	can	realize	an	innate	potential	for	being	human,	a	Rational	Animal:	
‘while	 animals	 survive	 by	 adjusting	 themselves	 to	 their	 background,	 man	
survives	by	adjusting	his	background	to	himself’. 	Like	Marsden	and	Lewis,	Rand	24
stresses	this	capacity	of	the	ego	to	transform	that	which	is	given	into	that	which	
is	 its	 own:	 the	 man	 of	 reason,	 is	 the	 Producer. 	 And,	 like	 Marsden,	 Rand	25
distinguishes	between	two	categories	–	broadly	corresponding	to	the	traditional	
Sciences	 and	 Humanities.	 ‘The	 professional	 businessman’,	 argues	 Rand,	 ‘is	 the	
;ield	 agent	 of	 the	 army	 whose	 commander-in-chief	 is	 the	 scientist’,	 while	 ‘The	
professional	intellectual	is	the	;ield	agent	of	the	army	whose	commander-in-chief	
is	the	philosopher’. 	And	once	again,	the	achievements	of	the	;irst	group	are	held	26
up	as	a	reproach	to	the	latter,	Rand	suggesting	(like	Marsden	some	years	earlier)	
that	philosophers	have	proven	either	unwilling	or	 incapable	of	moving	beyond	
phase	two. 	 ‘His	twin	brother,	the	businessman,	has	done	a	superlative	job	and	27
has	brought	men	to	an	unprecedented	material	prosperity’,	concludes	Rand.	‘But	
the	intellectual	has	sold	him	out	–	has	betrayed	their	common	source	–	has	failed	
in	 his	 own	 job	 and	has	 brought	men	 to	 spiritual	 bankruptcy.’ 	 As	 in	Time	and	28
Western	Man,	 Idealist	and	Empiricist	represent	a	relapse	to	earlier,	non-rational	
modes	of	being	–	Witch	Doctor	and	Attila,	respectively	–	two	“false	alternatives”	
persisting	 upon	 this	 second	 –	 more	 sophisticated	 –	 tier	 of	 the	 Stirnerian	
dialectic. 		29
	 	 	 	 	We	know	for	a	fact	that	Rand	and	her	immediate	circle	(who	ironically	called	
themselves	The	Collective)	were	familiar	with	Stirner	by	the	Sixties,	as	Nathaniel	
Branden	mentions	the	philosopher	(in	the	course	of	correcting	a	misconception	
that	egoism	is	doing	whatever	one	wants)	in	his	essay	‘Counterfeit	Individualism’	
(1962):	‘Nietzsche	and	Max	Stirner’,	he	writes,	‘are	sometimes	quoted	in	support	
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of	this	interpretation.’ 	But	the	reasoning	behind	this	rejection	of	Nietzschean	/	30
Stirnerian	egoism	is	entirely	consistent	with	the	way	in	which	Stirner’s	thought	
had	been	developed	earlier	in	the	century	by	leading	Modernist	writers	working	
within	a	Stirnerian	framework.	Lewis,	 for	 instance,	condemns	Henri	Bergson	in	
exactly	 the	 same	 terms	 in	Time	 and	Western	Man	 –	 arguing	 that	 the	 emphasis	
placed	upon	the	subconscious	implies	a	subordination	of	the	individual	to	some	
impersonal	system	that	must	compromise	the	integrity	of	the	Self. 	If	we	choose	31
to	take	Stirnerian	egoism	in	a	wider	sense	–	as	a	counterpart	to	Marxism,	a	living	
body	of	discourse,	open	to	reinterpretation	and	modi;ication,	rather	than	a	dead	
letter	 –	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Rand’s	 philosophy	 of	 rational	 self-interest	 differs	
from	Stirner	‘whim-worship’	presents	no	fundamental	obstacle	to	our	regarding	
the	former	as	an	off-shoot	of	the	latter,	part	of	this	one	tradition	/	anti-tradition	
of	radical	thought.			
	 	 	 	 	Put	simply,	The	Ego	and	His	Own	and	‘For	the	New	Intellectual’	have	far	more	
in	common	than	can	pass	for	chance;	and	Rand’s	moral	philosophy	(the	bedrock	
for	her	subsequent	Capitalist	politics	and	“Objectivist”	epistemology)	possesses	a	
peculiarly	Stirnerian	;lavour	too.	‘The	social	theory	of	ethics	substitutes	“society”	
for	God’,	states	Rand,	echoing	Stirner’s	critique	of	early	Socialism,	‘and	although	it	
claims	that	its	chief	concern	is	life	on	earth,	it	is	not	the	life	of	man,	not	the	life	of	
an	individual,	but	the	life	of	a	disembodied	entity,	the	collective,	which,	in	relation	
to	 every	 individual,	 consists	 of	 everybody	 except	 himself.’ 	 The	 egoism	 that	32
provided	 the	 initial	 impetus	 for	 Rand’s	 project	 has	 sometimes	 been	 likened	 to	
that	 of	 Nietzsche,	 but	 the	 particular	 thrust	 of	 her	 attack,	 in	 passages	 like	 this	
from	The	Virtue	of	SelIishness	(1964),	is	distinctly	Stirnerian	in	form	and	content,	
is	 on	 occasion	 near	word	 for	word:	 ‘since	 there	 is	 no	 such	 entity	 as	 “society”,’	
Rand	insists,	‘since	society	is	only	a	number	of	individual	men	–	this	means	that	
some	 men	 (the	 majority	 or	 any	 gang	 that	 claims	 to	 be	 its	 spokesman)	 are	
ethically	entitled	to	pursue	and	whims	(or	any	atrocities)	they	desire	to	pursue,	
while	other	men	are	ethically	obliged	 to	 spend	 their	 lives	 in	 the	 service	of	 that	
gang’s	desires.’ 		33
	 	 	 	 	This	(by	now	familiar)	moral	insight	can	also	be	seen	to	produce	similar	(and	
equally	startling)	political	conclusions	in	the	writings	of	both	Stirner	and	Rand.	
Unlike	his	early	Anarchist	admirers,	Stirner	did	not	push	for	the	abolition	of	the	
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State,	 imagining	 that	 statism	would	 inevitably	wither	 away	 as	more	 and	more	
egoists	opted	to	withdraw	their	creativity	 from	the	system,	 forming	 in	 its	stead	
the	Union	of	Egoists	–	a	voluntary	association,	 for	a	free	trade	in	properties	and	
powers,	bound	together	only	by	the	self-interest	of	each	individual	participant,	a	
perpetual	insurrection.	Stirner	was	vague	on	how	a	Union	might	work,	reserving	
the	right	 to	change	his	mind	to	suit	himself.	Having	dispensed	with	 this	crucial	
liberty,	Rand	is	more	forthcoming	–	and,	in	the	business	community	that	retires	
to	Galt’s	Gulch	 in	Atlas	Shrugged	we	have	a	 fantasy	 that	 is	closer	 than	anything	
produced	before	or	since	to	what	Max	Stirner	may	have	meant.	‘Here,’	Ellis	Wyatt	
tells	Dagney,	‘we	trade	achievements,	not	failures	–	values,	not	needs.	We’re	free	
of	 one	 another,	 yet	 we	 all	 grow	 together.’ 	 Indeed,	 Rand’s	 prime	 innovation	34
consists	in	her	recognition	that	Stirner’s	proposal	for	a	bartering	system	without	
State	intervention	is	already	there	in	the	laissez-faire	capitalism	of	Adam	Smith.	
‘Capitalism	is	based	on	self-interest	and	self-esteem’,	wrote	Greenspan	 in	1963;	
‘it	holds	holds	integrity	and	trustworthiness	as	cardinal	virtues	and	makes	them	
pay	off	in	the	market-place,	demanding	that	men	survive	by	means	of	virtues,	not	
of	vices.	It	is	this	superlatively	moral	system	that	the	welfare	statists	propose	to	
improve	on	by	means	of	preventive	 law,	 snooping	bureaucrats,	and	 the	chronic	
goad	of	fear.’ 	35
!
*	 *	 *	
!
But	 how	 to	 account	 for	 these	 parallels?	We	 have	 evidence	 to	 prove	 that	 Rand	
knew	of	Max	Stirner	by	the	beginning	of	the	Sixties	–	but	is	the	in;luence	of	that	
philosopher	 merely	 a	 late	 development,	 or	 is	 it	 still	 possible	 to	 conclude	 that	
these	unlikely	“Hegelian”	components	in	Rand’s	system	of	thought	were	acquired	
far	earlier,	during	her	formative	period,	in	Soviet	Russia,	as	Sciabarra	suggested?	
The	 available	 evidence	would	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 Rand	 did	 not	 possess	 Iirst-
hand	knowledge	of	Stirner	until	the	sixties	(and	perhaps	not	even	then).	 ‘These	
are	 the	vague	beginnings	of	 an	amateur	philosopher’,	writes	Rand,	 in	her	 ‘First	
Philosophic	 Journal’,	on	April	9,	1934.	 ‘To	be	checked	with	what	 I	 learn	when	 I	
master	philosophy	–	then	see	how	much	of	it	has	already	been	said,	and	whether	
I	have	anything	new	to	say,	or	anything	old	to	say	better	than	it	has	already	been	
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said.’ 	 –	 Subsequent	 entries	 indicate	 that	 Rand	worked	 through	 a	 reading-list	36
consisting	of	some	of	the	key	radical	right-wing	texts	of	the	era,	but	Stirner	had	
again	 fallen	 into	utter	obscurity,	 and	 the	only	name	 that	Rand	could	put	 to	 the	
body	 of	 ideas	 she	 had	 carried	with	 her,	 on	 leaving	 Russia	 for	 the	 New	World,	
remained	that	of	Friedrich	Nietzsche.		
					According	to	Barbara	Branden,	Rand	;irst	discovered	this	philosopher	while	at	
university,	when	 a	 cousin	 said	 to	 her,	 grinning	with	 a	 touch	 of	malice,	 ‘Here	 is	
someone	you	should	read,	because	he	beat	you	to	all	your	ideas.’	Intrigued,	Rand	
began	reading	Thus	Spake	Zarathustra.	In	Nietzsche,	Rand	believed	she	had	found	
a	writer	 ‘who	 felt	 as	 I	did	about	man,	who	saw	and	wanted	 the	heroic	 in	man;	
here	 was	 a	 writer	 who	 believed	 that	 a	 man	 should	 have	 a	 great	 purpose,	 a	
purpose	which	 is	 for	 his	 own	 sake,	 for	 his	 own	 happiness	 and	 his	 own	 sel;ish	
motives’. 	 His	 books	 would	 have	 a	 profound	 impact.	 ‘The	 seventeen-year-old	37
Rand	immediately	seized	upon	his	ideas,’	writes	Anne	C.	Heller,	‘including	his	call	
to	 discard	 old	 values	 and	 create	 new	 ones,	 his	 condemnation	 of	 altruism	 as	 a	
slave	morality,	his	argument	 for	 the	 inviolate	rights	of	 the	gifted	person,	whose	
only	obligation	is	to	re;ine	and	use	his	gifts	as	he	sees	;it’. 	From	the	;irst,	Rand	38
later	claimed,	Nietzsche’s	defense	of	psychological	determinism	had	troubled	her,	
and	so	too	various	statements	concerning	the	exercise	of	power.	 ‘I	believed	that	
the	 superior	 man	 could	 not	 be	 bothered	 enslaving	 others,	 that	 slavery	 is	
immoral,	 that	 to	enslave	his	 inferiors	 is	 an	unworthy	occupation	 for	 the	heroic	
man.’ 	According	to	Barbara	Branden,	when	Rand	read	further	in	Nietzsche	and	39
found	in	The	Birth	of	Tragedy	he	was	‘statedly	anti-reason’,	her	early	enthusiasm	
began	 to	 abate.	 ‘He	 said	 that	 reason	 is	 an	 inferior	 faculty,’	 remembered	 Rand,	
‘that	 drunken-orgy	 emotions	 were	 superior.	 That	 ;inished	 him	 as	 a	 spiritual	
ally.’ 		40
					Rand	is	here	somewhat	misleading.	It	is	precisely	those	aspects	of	Nietzschean	
thought	she	 later	professed	to	have	 immediately	disliked	which	 loom	largest	 in	
her	earliest	;ictional	writing.	In	detailed	plans	for	a	novel	to	have	been	called	‘The	
Little	 Street’,	 Rand	 models	 her	 anti-social	 hero	 Denis	 Renehan	 on	 the	 child-
murderer	William	Edward	Hickman.	Had	this	book	ever	been	completed	it	would	
have	resembled	something	approaching	a	cross	between	The	Outsider	by	Albert	
Camus	and	Truman	Capote’s	 In	Cold	Blood	–	a	supremely	amoral	modern	novel	
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that	would	have	forever	put	its	author	into	a	very	different	category	of	American	
literature.	Nietzschean	elements	persist	 in	 the	original	version	of	We	the	Living	
too.	In	a	passage	cut	from	later	editions,	a	Communist	called	Andrei	tells	the	hero	
Kira	 that	he	knows	what	 she	 is	 going	 to	 say:	 she	admires	Bolshevik	 ideals,	but	
loathes	their	methods.	‘I	loathe	your	ideals’,	Kira	replies,	‘I	admire	your	methods.	
If	one	believes	one’s	right,	one	shouldn’t	wait	 to	convince	millions	of	 fools,	one	
might	just	as	well	force	them.	I	don’t	know,	however,	whether	I’d	include	blood	in	
my	 methods.’ 	 Finally,	 early	 drafts	 for	 The	 Fountainhead	 indicate	 that	 Rand	41
initially	 conceived	 of	 even	 her	 exemplary	 egoist-as-creator,	Howard	Roark	 as	 a	
Nietzschean	Superman,	an	amoral	force	like	Denis	Renehan	in	‘The	Little	Street’,	
or	Lev	Manovich	in	We	the	Living.	(That	is	to	say,	rapist	and	terrorist).	Elements	
of	this	characterization	persist	in	the	;inished	novel:	Roark	(notoriously)	remains	
a	 rapist,	 and,	of	 course,	ultimately	dynamites	a	housing	estate.	But,	 fortunately,	
Nietzschean	 traces	 such	 as	 these	 are	 obscured	 by	 lyrical	 passages	 celebrating	
Rand’s	new	(Stirnerian )	concept	of	egoism	as	rational	self-interest.	Though	her	42
contempt	 for	 the	masses	 resurfaces	 to	 disastrous	 effect	 in	Atlas	 Shrugged,	 it	 is	
this	 emphasis	 on	 the	 creative	 potential	 of	 the	 individual,	 together	 with	 her	
celebration	of	loving	and	resilient	social-networks	(as	creators	unite	to	work	on	
projects	such	as	the	Stoddard	Temple)	for	which	Rand	is	best	remembered.		
					Having	noted	that	there	are	these	Nietzschean	elements	in	Rand’s	early	;iction	
is	it	possible	to	accept	these	represent	a	distortion	of	a	preexisting	egoism?	Rand	
insists	that	this	is	the	case,	but	suggests	that	this	insight	was	personal	and	owed	
nothing	to	education	or	environment:	for	how	could	an	egoist	owe	anything	to	a	
land	 as	 unrelentingly	 hostile	 to	 the	 individual	 as	 Russia?	 ‘My	 feeling	 toward	
Russia	 [is]	 simply	 an	 intensi;ied	 feeling	 that	 I’ve	 had	 from	 childhood	 and	 from	
before	the	revolutions,’	Rand	recalled.	 ‘I	felt	that	this	was	so	mystical,	depraved,	
rotten	a	country	that	I	wasn’t	surprised	that	they	got	a	Communist	ideology,	and	I	
felt	that	one	has	to	get	out	and	;ind	the	civilized	world.’ 		43
	 	 	 	 	In	Thomas	Masaryk’s	classic	history	The	Spirit	of	Russia	(1919)	we	;ind	that	
Subjectivism	was	resisted,	;iercely	in	fact,	by	a	vast	majority	of	Russian	thinkers	
through	the	nineteenth	century:	but,	signi;icantly,	 this	Subjectivism	‘was	 looked	
upon	chie;ly	as	the	doctrine	of	Stirner’. 	Aleksei	Homjakov,	Vissarion	Grigorevic	44
Belinskii,	Aleksandr	Herzen,	Mihail	Bakunin,	Dmitry	Pisarov,	Fyodor	Dostoevskii,	
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some	of	the	greatest	writers	in	the	extraordinary	renaissance	that	took	place	in	
Russia	 during	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	were	 struggling	with	 a	
speci;ically	 Stirnerian	 variety	 of	 subjectivity.	 Neither	 Europe	 nor	 the	 United	
States	could	have	presented	a	young	woman	with	greater	scope	for	encountering	
something	of	Stirner	at	secondhand.	We	know	Rand	read	novels	by	Dostoevskii,	
for	instance,	presenting	inversions,	in	her	own	work,	of	arguments	derived	from	
that	novelist’s	denunciation	of	egoism	in	Brothers	Karamazov	(1880).	‘For	a	long	
time,	I	studied	his	plots	carefully,’	she	told	B.	Branden,	‘to	see	how	he	integrated	
his	plots	to	his	ideas.’ 	And	in	the	nihilist	philosophy	of	Pisarev,	Rand	would	have	45
found	 (had	 she	 cared	 to	 look)	 an	 interpretation	 of	 Stirner	 that	 anticipated	 her	
own	 much-vaunted	 emphasis	 upon	 a	 rational	 egoism.	 ‘He	 preached	 radical	
individualism,’	writes	Masaryk,	 ‘understanding	by	this	 term	the	struggle	 for	the	
emancipation	of	the	individuality,	a	struggle	that	for	him	embodied	the	essential	
meaning	of	civilization.’ 	Toward	the	end	of	his	great	survey	of	Russian	thought,	46
Masaryk	would	note	the	 increasing	 in;luence	of	Stirnerian	Egoism	on	Anarchist	
thinkers	in	particular	at	the	time	he	was	writing	(WWI).	‘The	already	great	vogue	
of	 Nietzsche,	 Stirner	 and	 Ibsen	 continually	 increases	 …	 A	 number	 of	 recent	
writers	 have	 adopted	 anarchist	 views	 under	 the	 in;luence	 of	 these	 and	 other	
European	exemplars.	I	may	refer	to	F.	Sologub	with	his	solipsist	paroxysms;	and	
to	L.	Sestov,	an	imitator	of	Stirner	and	Nietzsche…’ 	47
	 	 	 	 	This	state	of	affairs	in	the	period	preceding	the	revolution	has	been	obscured	
by	 Soviet	 propaganda.	 ‘Consult	 any	 history	 of	 the	 Russian	 avant-garde’,	 Allan	
Antliff	 observes,	 ‘and	 you	 read	 that	 the	 artistic	 left	 pledged	 allegiance	 to	 the	
“October	 Revolution,”	 i.e.	 the	 Communist	 Party	 coup	 of	 1917	 and	 subsequent	
dictatorship.’ 	 As	 he	 and	 Nina	 Gurianova	 have	 discovered,	 in	 groundbreaking	48
studies	of	anarchy	and	art,	what	this	narrative	misrepresents	is	a	‘messy	history’	
of	 artistic	 rebellion	on	 the	part	 of	many	 in	 the	Russian	avant-garde	 in	 the	 ;irst	
years	of	the	Revolution:	‘when	anarchism,	not	Marxism,	was	the	raison	d’etre	of	
their	 art.’ 	 As	Masaryk	 could	 have	 told	 us,	 the	 years	 between	 1917	 and	 1919	49
were	in	fact	the	third	in	a	series	of	three	waves	in	the	history	of	Russian	political	
anarchism.	The	;irst	of	these	in	the	1870s	produced	a	wide	spectrum	of	different	
types	of	anarchism	(e.g.	 the	anarcho-christianity	of	Leo	Tolstoy).	The	next	 took	
place	 between	 1905	 and	 1907,	 during	 the	 ;irst	 of	 the	 revolutions	 against	 the	
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Tsarist	 regime.	 And	 signi;icantly,	 according	 to	 Gurianova,	 ‘The	 situation	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 century	 helped	 to	 promote	 different	 forms	 of	 anarcho-
individualism,	 rather	 than	 anarcho-syndicalism	 or	 anarcho-communism’. 	 This	50
;inal	 wave	 of	 insurrection	 happened	 to	 coincide	 with	 the	 publication	 of	 six	
translations	of	Stirner’s	book	(between	1906	and	1910). 	As	a	direct	result,	an	51
anarcho-individualist	sensibility	emerged	in	Russia,	which	drew	heavily	upon	the	
writing	of	Max	Stirner.		
	 	 	 	 	 In	 his	 presentation	 of	 Russian	 anarchist	 tendencies	 at	 the	 International	
Anarchist	Congress	in	1907,	for	instance,	anarcho-communist	Vladimir	Ivanovich	
Zabrezhnev	 (Fedorov)	 singled	 out	 Stirner’s	 philosophy	 for	 criticism,	 observing	
that	 the	 philosophy	 was	 proving	 popular	 –	 not	 with	 the	 factory-workers	 and	
revolutionary	 youth	 –	 but	 with	 an	 intelligentsia	 that	 ‘tried	 to	 keep	 away	 from	
revolution.’	 According	 to	 Fedorov,	 these	 Russians	 ‘naturally	 preferred	 Stirner’s	
ideas	and	contradictory	theory,	[because	these]	allow	any	arbitrary	conclusions’.	
He	concluded	these	groups	had	no	knowledge	or	understanding	of	anarchism	as	
an	integral	philosophy:	‘anarcho-individualists,	Mystical	Anarchists	and	…	sexual	
perverts	grow	out	of	Stirner’s	ideas’. 	Unhappily	for	Fedorov,	these	ideas	would	52
in	fact	provide	the	next	generation	of	Russian	Modernists	with	their	 ideological	
motivation.	Though	not	widespread	in	Russia,	individualist-anarchism	possessed	
an	 intense	 appeal	 throughout	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 in	 the	 great	
metropolitan	centres	for	the	small	circles	of	writers	and	artists	that	constituted	
the	“intelligentsia”. 	In	1913,	Ivan	Ignatiev,	for	instance,	became	chairman	of	the	53
Intuitive	Association	of	Ego-Futurism,	a	group	that	included	poets	such	as	Vasilik	
Gnedov,	Shirokov,	and	Dmitrii	Kriuchkov.	 ‘He	used	wordplay	to	name	the	group,	
in	allusion	to	the	most	recent	psychoanalyticalic	concept	of	“ego”,	and	after	Max	
Stirner’s	 individualist	 hero	 of	Der	 Einzige	 und	 sein	 Eigentum	 (The	 Ego	 and	 Its	
Own),	 a	 book	 that	had	 an	 immense	 in;luence	on	Russian	 culture,	 from	Apollon	
Griegoriev	 and	 Dostoevsky	 to	 the	 Futurists’,	 explains	 Gurianova.	 ‘Ignatiev	 and	
Gnedov	made	direct	 references	 to	 anarcho-individualist	 ideas	 in	 their	writings,	
for	example,	 in	Ignatiev’s	manifesto	“Ego-Futurism,”	he	praises	Ego-Futurism	as	
egovyi	anarchism’. 		54
	 	 	 	 	Such	groups	would	acquire	greater	prominence	with	the	last	and	strongest	
period	of	anarchist	revival	that	began	in	1917.	While	charismatic	Nestor	Makhno	
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fought	under	the	Black	Flag	in	the	Ukraine,	on	multiple	fronts,	against	White	and	
Red,	 the	 Moscow	 Federation	 of	 Anarchists	 was	 running	 twenty-;ive	 anarchist	
clubs	across	the	capital,	and	distributing	ri;les,	pistols	and	grenades	to	a	militia	
known	as	 the	“Black	Guard”. 	According	 to	Antliff,	 these	clubs	were	more	 than	55
meeting-places;	 they	were	 radical	 cultural	 institutions.	 ‘For	 example,	 the	 “Dom	
Anarkhiia”	 (House	 of	 Anarchy),	where	 the	 federation’s	 of;icial	 paper	Anarkhiia	
was	 published,	 also	 featured	 a	 library	 and	 reading	 room,	 “proletarian	 art	
printing”	 facilities,	 a	poetry	 circle,	 and	a	 large	 theater	hall	 in	which	plays	were	
performed	 and	 lectures	 held’. 	 The	 radical	writers	 and	 artists	 that	 frequented	56
these	clubs	include	many	of	the	most	signi;icant	names	in	the	period,	 including	
painter	Aleksandr	Rodchenko,	Kazimir	Malevich	 (the	 leader	of	 the	Suprematist	
school	of	painters),	sculptor	Vladimir	Tatlin,	and	poets	Vladimir	Mayakovski	and	
Vasili	Kamenski.		 	 												
					In	the	present	context	“Rodchenko’s	System”	is	of	particular	interest.	An	effort	
to	upstage	Malevich	and	Tatlin,	Rodchenko	wrote	this	manifesto	to	accompany	a	
series	of	paintings	called	Black	on	Black	(1919).	Rejecting	the	transcendental	ego	
posited	by	Suprematism	as	merely	another	iteration	of	that	mystical	abstraction	
(or	“spook”)	Humanity,	Rodchenko	insisted	upon	an	ego	that	would	be	a	nothing,	
perpetually	negating	each	new	af;irmation	of	his	own	from	moment	to	moment.	
As	we	will	see,	it	is	in	fact	on	this	point	that	Rand	breaks	with	Stirner	and	with	all	
previous	 Modernist	 writers	 in	 this	 “Stirnerian”	 tradition.	 In	 a	 document	 that	
opens	with	passages	from	Der	Einzige	und	sein	Eigentum,	Rodchenko	announced	
that	the	downfall	of	all	“isms”	in	painting	must	mark	the	beginning	of	his	ascent.	
Note	that	the	artist	insists	on	Stirnerian	analysis	rather	than	Hegelian	synthesis	as	
the	motive	power	of	individual	creativity:	
To	 the	 sound	 of	 the	 funeral	 bells	 of	 color	 painting,	 the	 last	 “ism”	 is	
accompanied	on	its	way	to	eternal	peace,	the	last	love	and	hope	collapse,	
and	 I	 leave	 the	house	of	dead	 truths.	The	motive	power	 is	not	 synthesis	
but	invention	(analysis).	Painting	is	the	body;	creativity,	the	spirit.	…	I	am	
the	inventor	of	new	discoveries	in	painting. 	57
!
*	 *	 *	
!
Is	there	evidence	to	suggest	that	Rand	engaged	with	this	extraordinary	moment	
of	Stirnerian	anarcho-individualism	in	politics	and	art?	–	Rand	is	known	to	have	
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joined	an	underground	network	of	writers’	clubs	in	St.	Peterburg,	participating	in	
a	 subversive	 discourse	 that	 drew	 heavily	 on	 these	 theories.	 Heller	 notes	 that	
Rand	never	publicly	acknowledged	the	in;luences	that	seem	to	enter	the	writing	
she	produced	at	this	time,	but	that	these	are	evident	nonetheless	–	 ‘stories	and	
novel	of	a	few	then-famous	Russian	futurist	and	surrealist	[sic]	writers	who	lived	
in	 St.	 Petersburg	 in	 the	 early	 1920s	 and	made	 their	 names	 by	 envisioning	 the	
utopian,	and	anti-utopian,	potential	of	the	decade’s	new	machines’. 	Rand	makes	58
(rather	vague)	 reference	 to	 this	modernist	material	 in	 interviews	with	Barbara	
Branden	 thirty	 years	 later.	 ‘There	were	 a	 couple	 of	modern	 novels	 by	 Russian	
writers	that	were	semi-anti-Soviet	or	thinly	veiled	anti-Soviet	that	I	liked	for	that	
reason,	 but	 that	was	minor’,	 she	 insisted.	 ‘I	 don’t	 even	 remember	 the	 authors’	
names.’ 	While	most	accept	 this	dismissal,	Heller	notes	 that	Rand’s	sci-;i	novel	59
Anthem	(1938)	‘clearly	re;lects	their	in;luence’. 		60
	 	 	 	 	Rand	would	recall	she	got	the	idea	for	this	book	in	her	school	days,	‘in	Soviet	
Russia,	 when	 [she]	 heard	 all	 the	 vicious	 attacks	 on	 individualism,	 and	 asked	
[herself]	what	the	world	would	be	like	if	men	lost	the	word	“I”. 	Though	Soviet	61
Russia	 is	 only	 credited	 with	 raising	 the	 question,	 Branden	 hints	 that	 Futurist	
Russia	offered	her	the	answer.	In	her	of;icial	biography	(based	for	the	most	part	
upon	recorded	conversations	with	Rand)	Barbara	Branden	remarks	that	the	idea	
of	projecting	such	a	dystopian	society	was	not	new,	being	part	of	the	intellectual	
ferment	of	the	twenties.	–	‘Yevgeny	Zamyatin	wrote	his	novel	We	in	1920-1921:	it	
could	 not	 be	 published	 in	 Soviet	 Russia	 but	 was	 read	 to	 writers’	 groups	 and	
widely	discussed	throughout	Petrograd’. 	Though	published	in	English	in	1924,	62
the	book	was	not	nearly	as	famous	as	it	has	became	in	the	years	since	Branden	
published	her	biography:	and	so	it	is	quite	possible	that	this	;inal	obscure	detail	
relating	to	how	writing	was	circulated	(through	Samizdat)	during	the	Soviet	era	
is	taken	from	Rand.	In	any	event,	the	parallels	are	indeed	striking	and	pervasive.					
					Each	book	consists	of	a	series	of	diary-entries	presenting	readers	with	a	future	
in	which	individualism	is	eradicated	and	there	is	only	a	collective:	a	totalitarian	
society	where	deviance	is	punished	by	death.	In	each	case	the	story	hinges	upon	
a	moment	of	crisis	when	the	altruism	that	hold	the	society	together	is	threatened	
by	 a	 resurgent	 egoism:	 the	writer	 of	 each	 journal	 has	 begun	 to	 love	 a	 speci;ic	
woman	above	the	all,	thereby	reactivating	an	“atavistic”	ego	that	can	never	again	
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be	at	one	with	 the	rest.	 In	 the	context	of	 this	essay,	 the	single	most	 interesting	
parallel	between	the	stories	of	D-503	and	Equality	7-2521	is	the	representation	
of	socialism	in	Stirnerian	terms,	as	merely	 the	reiteration	of	Christian	altruism,	
part	 of	 the	 spiritual	 (or	 Shamanist)	 phase	 in	 the	 history	 of	 humanity’s	 moral	
development.	D-503	recognizes	that	his	society	is	based	on	an	idea	‘understood	
by	the	Christians,	our	only	(if	very	imperfect)	predecessors:	Humility	is	a	virtue,	
pride	a	vice;	We	comes	from	God,	I	from	the	devil’. 	And	this	insight	is	re;lected	63
in	the	religious	language	Equality	7-2521	adopts	in	the	early	pages	of	his	journal.	
‘By	the	grace	of	our	brothers	are	we	allowed	our	lives.	We	exist	through,	by	and	
for	our	brothers	who	are	the	State.	Amen.’ 	64
	 	 	 	 	But	as	Shoshana	Milgram	points	out,	the	many	similarities	between	We	and	
Anthem	(such	as	the	regimentation	of	life,	the	world-wide	state,	the	replacement	
of	names	by	numbers,	and	the	;irst-person	narrative	by	a	rebellious	protagonist)	
provide	no	basis	for	assuming	a	causal	relationship.	There	is	nothing	in	Anthem	
that	Rand	could	not	have	 taken	 from	half-a-dozen	utopias	 in	circulation	during	
the	twenties.	(Many	of	these	actually	put	into	print	by	Zamyatin	while	working	as	
an	 editor	 for	 the	World	 Literature	Publishing	House. )	As	Milgram	points	 out,	65
the	moral	purpose	underpinning	the	two	Russian	texts	is	not	especially	unusual	
either,	but	pervasive	in	work	of	writers	who	did	not	immediately	follow	the	path	
of	 proletarian	 culture.	Writers	 such	 as	 poet	Vladimir	Mayakovsky,	 for	 instance,	
expressed	contempt	for	a	proletarian	school	that	believed	it	could	achieve	a	new	
collectivism	by	effecting	the	abolition	of	the	“I”.		
		
The	Proletcultists	never	speak	/	of	“I”	/	or	of	the	personality.	
They	consider	/	the	pronoun	“I”	/	a	kind	of	rascality.	.	.	.	
But	in	my	opinion	/	if	you	write	petty	stuff,	you	/	
will	never	crawl	out	of	your	lyrical	slough	/	
even	if	you	substitute	We	for	I. 	66
!
!
Shoshana	Milgram	 is	 clearly	 right	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 no	 case	 for	 insisting	
upon	a	causal	relationship	between	We	and	Anthem:	and	for	the	matter	in	hand	
this	hardly	matters.	The	evidence	compiled	by	Randian	scholars	for	and	against	
has	simply	served	to	underline	one	hugely	signi;icant	point.	–	That	Rand	was	a	
product,	 typical	 in	 every	 respect,	 of	 this	 speci;ic	 time	and	place,	 an	 intellectual	
milieu	saturated	by	radical	subjectivity.	 It	 is	now	possible	 to	understand	how	a	
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precocious	undergraduate	might	have	come	to	assimilate	 the	key	premises	and	
methodological	 procedures	 at	 second-hand	 never	 knowing	 of	 their	 provenance.	
The	writing	of	Ayn	Rand	can	now	be	recognized	as	a	belated	contribution	to	that	
extraordinary	moment	in	the	history	of	First	Wave	Modernism	when	writers	and	
artists	 across	Europe	 explored	 the	 creative	 and	political	 potential	 of	 Stirnerian	
insurrection.			
!
*		 *	 *	
!
This	new	context	must	subtly	alter	a	sense	of	the	nature	of	Rand’s	achievement.	
As	we	have	seen,	Rand	believed	that	the	thing	that	put	her	work	in	a	place	apart	
from	previous	writing	in	the	individualist	tradition	was	the	emphasis	placed	on	
reason.	 ‘The	 advocacy	 of	 individualism	 as	 such	 is	 not	 new’,	 writes	 Nathaniel	
Branden	 in	 ‘Counterfeit	 Individualism’.	 What	 is	 new	 is	 the	 de;inition	 of	 an	
individualist	as	a	man	who	lives	not	merely	for	his	own	sake	but	by	his	own	mind.	
‘An	individualist	is,	;irst	and	foremost,	a	man	of	reason.’ 	–	And	this	assessment	67
of	the	Objectivist	contribution	to	individualism	appears	particularly	self-evident	
in	 those	 critical	 pieces	 that	 consider	Anthem	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 nineteenth	 and	
twentieth	century	history	of	the	literary	utopia.		
	 	 	 	 	By	 far	 the	most	comprehensive	evaluation	of	 this	kind	 is	 that	of	Shoshana	
Milgram,	 who	 compares	 Rand’s	 novel	 to	 Fyodor	 Dostoevsky’s	 Notes	 from	
Underground,	 H.G.	 Wells’s	 The	 Time	 Machine,	 The	 Sleeper	 Wakes,	 A	 Modern	
Utopia,	John	W.	Campbell’s	‘Twilight’,	E.M.	Forster’s	‘The	Machine	Stops’,	Yevgeny	
Zamyatin’s	We,	Aldous	Huxley’s	Brave	New	World,	Stephen	Benet’s	 ‘The	Place	of	
the	 Gods’,	 and	 George	 Orwell’s	 1984.	 In	 this	 context	 the	 rationalist	 turn	
highlighted	by	Nathaniel	Branden,	the	break	with	‘irrational’	forms	of	egoism,	is	
unarguably	 the	 most	 distinctive	 aspect	 of	 Rand’s	 intervention.	 For	 her	 work	
emerges	as	the	;irst	to	challenge	the	conviction	that	the	future	most	to	be	feared	
is	 the	 tyranny	 of	 Reason.	 The	 city	 of	 glass	 in	 Zamyatin,	 for	 instance,	 ‘this	
extremely	transparent	and	permanent	crystal’,	is	an	imaginative	projection	of	the	
Crystal	 Palace	 described	 by	Dostoevsky;	 the	 regimentation	 of	 One-State	makes	
real	the	possibility	of	a	‘mathematical	table’	to	regulate	desires	imagined	by	the	
Underground	 Man. 	 But	 as	 Heller	 points	 out,	 ‘Rand	 concluded	 –	 long	 before	68
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most	 others	 –	 that	 totalitarianism	 doesn’t	 work,	 because	 the	 independent	
motivation	 indispensable	 to	economic	and	social	progress	 cannot	 survive	 in	an	
atmosphere	of	intimidation,	coercion,	and	lack	of	individually	earned	rewards’. 	69
Consequently,	the	collective	in	Rand’s	Anthem	neither	live	in	crystalline	housing	
complexes	nor	manufacture	anything	like	D-503’s	interstellar	rocket-ship	(called	
the	 INTEGRAL).	 The	 abolition	 of	 the	 “I”	 is	 instead	 shown	 to	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	
physical	 as	well	 as	 spiritual	 degradation.	 The	 candle	 is	 the	most	 sophisticated	
invention	to	have	been	produced	by	her	Committee	of	Scholars	–	and	this	is	said	
to	 have	 taken	 ;ifty	 years.	Milgram	 concludes	 that	where	 the	Underground	Man	
had	 turned	on	mathematics	as	 the	 fundamental	quality	of	 the	Crystal	Palace	at	
which	he	wished	to	hurl	stones,	Rand	rejects	this	unwarranted	assault	on	reason	
and	 technology:	 –	 ‘reason	 is	 an	 individual	 act,	 a	 volitional	 act,	 and	 is	 thus	
anything	but	the	enemy	of	freedom’. 	In	line	with	this	shift,	Rand	imagines	that	70
individual	 rebellion	 against	 any	 form	of	 collective	 oppression	must	 necessarily	
manifest	itself	 in	thinking	for	oneself,	rather	than	being	driven	by	subconscious	
impulses.	 In	Notes	 from	 Underground,	 the	 narrator	 asks,	 ‘What	 do	 the	 laws	 of	
nature	and	arithmetic	have	to	do	with	me,	if	for	some	reason,	I	don’t	happen	to	
like	those	laws	and	that	twice	two	is	four?’ 	In	Atlas	Shrugged,	Galt	replies,	‘the	71
noblest	 act	 you	 have	 ever	 performed	 is	 the	 act	 of	 your	mind	 in	 the	 process	 of	
grasping	that	two	and	two	make	four.’ 		72
					But	what	remains	a	seismic	shift	within	the	genre	of	utopian	;iction	is	nothing	
of	the	sort	within	the	context	of	egoism	more	generally,	where	this	move	toward	
reason	had	been	anticipated	by	a	series	of	modernists	working	on	the	Stirnerian	
basis	that	Rand	herself	either	began	with	or	later	adopted.	Dmitry	Pisarev,	Dora	
Marsden,	James	Joyce,	Wyndham	Lewis	–	had	all	promoted	the	idea	that	sel;hood	
requires	 the	 practice	 of	 reason;	 the	 latter	 two	 had	 even	 attempted	 something	
resembling	 that	peculiar	 fusion	of	 egoism	and	Aristotelian	Thomism	 that	Rand	
took	 such	 particular	 pride	 in:	 ‘In	 philosophy	 I	 can	 only	 recommend	 the	 Three	
“A”s,	 ‘	she	would	often	say;	 ‘Aristotle,	Aquinas	and	Ayn	Rand!’	The	move	toward	
reason	 is	clearly	not	the	most	distinctive	aspect	of	Rand’s	philosophy,	 though	 it	
may	be	the	most	interesting	–	and	appealing.		
	 	 	 	 	In	fact,	the	true	break	with	previous	writing	in	this	Stirnerian	and	Modernist	
tradition	is	a	consequence	of	her	refusal	to	question	a	key	premise	underpinning	
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the	 subjectivist	 rebellion	against	utopia;	her	originality	within	 the	new	context	
that	 has	 been	 established	 in	 this	 essay	 is	 the	direct	 result	 of	 an	unquestioning	
acceptance	of	 the	assumption	that	whim	 is	a	characteristic	of	 the	subconscious.	
‘To	 the	 irrationalist,’	 Nathaniel	 Branden	 explains,	 ‘existence	 is	 merely	 a	 clash	
between	his	whims	and	the	whims	of	others;	 the	concept	of	an	objective	 reality	
has	no	reality	for	him.’ 	–	The	consequences	that	must	result	from	this	attempt	73
to	amputate	whim,	the	desire	for	an	‘independence	from	reality’,	are	spelled	out	
by	Rand’s	contemporary,	the	anarchist	Murray	Rothbard	in	a	letter	to	his	friend	
Richard	 Cornuelle,	 written	 in	 1954,	 when	 he	 claims:	 ‘she	 actually	 denies	 all	
individuality	whatsoever!’	His	reason	for	saying	so	would	have	provoked	nothing	
but	 scorn	 from	Rand,	 for	 he	 is	 clearly	 adopting	 the	 subjectivist	 or	 irrationalist	
position	when	he	 states	 that	 individuality	 consists	 in	 emotions	 and	 in	 instinct.	
But	this	in	no	way	invalidates	his	point:	to	assert	men	are	‘bundles	of	premises’,	
in	the	way	that	Rand	does,	before	proceeding	to	outline	what	the	premises	ought	
to	be	for	a	man	of	reason,	 is	to	effect	a	negation	of	the	individual	self	–	because	
the	individual	self	is	thereby	rendered	interchangeable	with	any	other	individual	
self	–	only	provided	the	latter	is	suf;iciently	rational	enough.	‘There	is	no	reason	
[therefore]	 whatsoever,	 why	 Ayn,	 for	 example,	 shouldn’t	 sleep	 with	 Nathan’,	
Rothbard	concludes. 	The	 faculty	of	 reason	has	been	set	up	above	and	beyond	74
the	self	–	in	a	totalizing	system	that	must	refuse	to	accept	as	fully	human	anyone	
that	refuses	to	conform	to	what	is	deemed	reason.	The	rational	self	 is	rendered	
impervious	 to	any	 further	analysis	 (αναλυωa:	 “I	unravel”)	–	Stirner’s	perpetual	
negation	 of	 the	 posited	 persona.	 This	 is	 the	 point	 whereon	 Rand	 differs	 most	
from	 earlier	writers	 in	 the	 Stirnerian	 tradition.	 Not	 on	 reason	per	 se	 –	 but	 on	
whether	being	a	man	of	reason	is	compatible	with	your	believing	that	you	might	
change	your	mind	to	suit	yourself	–	on	whether	you	have	the	right	to	assert	your	
independence	from	objective	reality	through	continuous	mercurial	self-renewal.		
					In	fact,	over	the	course	of	her	long	life	Rand	was,	of	course,	capable	of	the	most	
breathtaking	 feats	 of	 self-reinvention	 (not	 least	 when	 a	 young	 Russian	 called	
Alyssa	Rosenbaum	 transformed	herself	 into	 the	American	Rand)	disorientating	
those	around	her	with	sudden,	unacknowledged	reorganizations	of	her	personal	
history.	 That	 Rand	 possessed	 this	 capacity	 for	 ecstasy	 or	 ek-stasis,	 for	 standing	
forth	 from	 her	 given	 situation,	 is	 only	 surprising	 if	 one	 accepts	 her	 Objectivist	
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philosophy.	 In	 fact,	 ‘it	 is	 our	 very	 incapacity	…	 to	 constitute	ourselves	 as	being	
what	we	are’,	remarks	Sartre,	‘which	means	that,	as	soon	as	we	posit	ourselves	as	
a	 certain	 being,	 by	 a	 legitimate	 judgment,	 based	 on	 an	 inner	 experience	 or	
correctly	deduced	from	a	priori	or	empirical	premises,	then	by	that	very	positing	
we	surpass	this	being	–	and	that	not	toward	another	being	but	toward	emptiness,	
toward	nothing.’ 	The	point	we	lose	this	nothing	that	separates	us	from	what	we	75
are	 is	 the	 very	moment	 of	 death.	 No	 longer	 is	 there	 this	nothing	 between	 our	
selves	and	our	past:	we	become	our	past,	;ixed	forever,	an	empirical	fact.	But	like	
Marx	 and	 Engels,	 a	 century	 earlier,	 Rand	 would	 eventually	 condemn	 this	
Stirnerian	 ‘ReiIication	of	the	Zero’	–	as	mere	 ‘juggling	tricks	on	the	tight-rope	of	
the	objective’. 		76
It	consists	of	regarding	“nothing”	as	a	thing,	as	a	special,	different	kind	of	
existent.	 (For	 example,	 see	 Existentialism.)	 This	 fallacy	 breeds	 such	
symptoms	 as	 the	 notion	 that	 presence	 and	 absence,	 or	 being	 and	 non-
being,	 are	 metaphysical	 forces	 of	 equal	 power,	 and	 that	 being	 is	 the	
absence	 of	 non-being.	 E.g.,	 “Nothingness	 is	 prior	 to	 being.”	 (Sartre)	 –	
“Human	;initude	is	the	presence	of	the	not	in	the	being	of	man.”	(William	
Barrett)	 –	 “Nothing	 is	more	 real	 than	nothing.”	 (Samuel	Beckett)	 –	 “Das	
Nichts	nichtet”	or	“Nothing	noughts.”	(Heidegger).	“Consciousness,	then,	is	
not	a	stuff,	but	a	negation.	The	subject	is	not	a	thing,	but	a	non-thing.	The	
subject	 carves	 its	 own	 world	 out	 of	 Being	 by	 means	 of	 negative	
determinations.	 Sartre	 describes	 consciousness	 as	 a	 ‘noughting	 nought	
(néant	néantisant).	It	is	a	form	of	being	other	than	its	own:	a	mode	‘which	
has	 yet	 to	be	what	 it	 is,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	which	 is	what	 it	 is,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	
which	is	what	it	is	not	and	which	is	not	what	it	was.’” 		77
!
However,	even	Rand	could	not	sustain	an	existence	that	could	proceed	as	though	
such	“concept-stealing”	were	not	 inevitable	–	 live	 in	a	way	that	might	vindicate	
her	identi;ication	of	the	rational	subject	with	his/her	objective	reality.	In	calling	
for	this	equation	to	take	place,	Rand	condemned	herself,	and	her	disciples,	to	Bad	
Faith.		
	 	 	 	 	Curiously,	Rand	once	toyed	with	calling	her	philosophy	Existentialism	(until	
told	the	name	was	taken).	Chosen	to	re;lect	a	de;initive	break	with	Subjectivism,	
her	refusal	of	solipsism,	Rand’s	turn	toward	Objectivism	perfectly	describes	what	
her	system	became.	Where	Stirner	had	preempted	the	Existentialists	in	asserting	
that	the	ego	possessed	a	continual	capacity	for	ecstatic	disavowal,	Rand’s	Subject	
must	try	to	live	as	though	one	with	its	conception	of	a	rational	Self,	to	live	being	
its	 own	 Object.	 If	 the	 consequences	 are	 not	 suf;iciently	 clear,	 read	 Nathaniel	
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Branden’s	harrowing	account	of	trying	to	break	off	a	perfectly	logical	affair	with	
Rand.	If	this	peculiar	brand	of	Egoism	does	continue	to	work	as	a	defense	against	
the	depredations	of	external	authority,	it	can	no	longer	do	anything	to	protect	the	
individual	from	forms	of	self-oppression,	tyrannies	far	worse	than	anything	that	
might	 have	 been	 imposed	 from	 outside	 because	 all-pervasive,	 internalized.	
Where	 Stirner	 resolved	 to	 become	 his	 own	 cause	 and	 to	 set	 this	 cause	 upon	
nothing,	Rand	 relinquished	 the	 capacity	 for	 self-analysis	 that	 alone	 guaranteed	
the	freedom	of	the	ego	–	and	thereby	lapsed	from	egoism	into	mere	chauvinism,	
that	is	to	say,	the	subordination	of	the	self	to	a	cause	that	appears	to	require	no	
sacri;ice	 (as	 in	 altruism)	because	 the	 cause	 is	 ones	own,	 but	which	 for	 all	 that	
means	 the	 ego	 is	 no	 less	 a	 slave	 to	 a	 cause	 –	 the	 cause	 is	 merely	 ones	 own	
persona,	ones	status	as	an	object.	In	short:	Objectivism	is	no	philosophy	for	living	
but	for	those	who	would	choose	to	be	living	dead.		
!
*		 *	 *	
!
In	 ‘The	Lesbian	Session’,	his	famous	essay	on	Rand	in	Lacanian	Ink,	Slavoj	Žižek	
has	observed	 that	 ‘although	 it	 is	easy	 to	dismiss	 the	very	mention	of	Rand	 in	a	
“serious”	 theoretical	 article	 as	 an	 obscene	 extravaganza	 –	 artistically,	 she	 is	 of	
course,	 worthless	 –	 the	 properly	 subversive	 dimension	 of	 her	 ideological	
procedure	is	not	to	be	underestimated.’ 	 In	fact,	Žižek	then	goes	on	to	suggest,	78
‘Rand	 ;its	 into	 the	 line	 of	 over-conformist	 authors	 who	 undermine	 the	 ruling	
ideological	edi;ice	by	their	very	excessive	identi;ication	with	it.’ 	Having	traced	79
the	development	of	Rand’s	ideas	in	considerable	detail,	we	are	now	in	a	position	
to	establish	the	precise	nature	and	extent,	of	this	properly	subversive	dimension.		
	 	 	 	 	Developed	 in	one	of	 the	 three	most	oppressive	autocracies	of	nineteenth-
century	Europe,	Stirnerian	egoism	was	designed	to	effect	wholesale	destruction,	
to	poison	any	political	system	into	which	it	was	introduced,	to	render	the	altruist	
morality	required	to	sustain	a	collective	enterprise	impossible	through	perpetual	
insurrection	or	general	strike,	a	withdrawal	of	properties	and	powers	on	the	part	
of	those	resolved	to	put	no	cause	before	their	own	freedom	for	creative	negation.	
Rand’s	philosophy,	though	differing	in	certain	respects,	is	at	one	with	the	original	
in	its	political	intent.	No	one	who	reads	Atlas	Shrugged	can	be	under	any	illusion	
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on	this	point.	Rand	is	clear	on	the	consequences	that	must	follow	for	the	United	
States	if	only	a	suf;icient	number	of	Americans	began	to	participate	in	a	political	
insurrection	of	the	sort	she	imagines.	John	Galt	really	does	stop	the	motor	of	the	
World.		
	 	 	 	 	Yet	every	day	brings	new	stories	of	insurrection	on	the	part	of	those	rich	and	
powerful	no	longer	prepared	to	sacri;ice	themselves	to	a	political	system	based	
on	altruism.	As	Žižek	has	remarked,	in	a	caustic	op-ed	for	The	Guardian,	we	now	
know	precisely	who	John	Galt	is:	 ‘John	Galt	is	the	idiot	responsible	for	the	2008	
;inancial	meltdown,	 and	 for	 the	 ongoing	 federal	 government	 shut	 down	 in	 the	
US.’ 	 Having	 persuaded	 her	 readers	 that	 ‘Big	 Business’	 is	 ‘America’s	 most	80
persecuted	minority’,	Rand	prevents	any	further	act	of	self-appraisal	 that	might	
prevent	 such	 sel;ishness	 from	 ossifying	 into	 a	 pursuit	 of	 ;ixed	 ideas	 that	
eventually	begin	to	work	against	their	own	self-interest.	Having	bought	the	Rand	
line	on	insurrection,	these	readers	are	“locked	into	the	product”	right	to	the	end.	
Let	 us	 be	 quite	 clear	 on	 this	 point.	 If	 the	 Union	 of	 States	 established	 by	 the	
American	Revolution	collapses	 this	will	be	because	 those	with	 the	most	 to	 lose	
from	 such	 a	 scenario	 have	 consciously	 adopted	 and	 consistently	 promoted	 a	
radical	Hegelian	philosophy	that	is	fundamentally	hostile	to	the	Lockean	political	
principles	 that	underpin	 the	system	upon	which	 they	depend.	 (A	 fact	not	often	
noted	 in	 relation	 to	 Rand’s	 last	 novel:	 even	 millionaires	 living	 in	 a	 ‘Utopia	 of	
Greed’	 are	 compelled,	 having	 effected	 the	 collapse	 of	 civilization,	 to	 muck	 out	
their	 own	 pigs	 by	 hand.)	Might	 the	 unrelenting	 insurrection	 of	 the	 Super-Rich	
actually	constitute	the	most	monstrous	self-abnegation?	–	This	 is	your	wake-up	
call.	Good	morning,	America!	
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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